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diction.4 8 Certainly, if federal courts consider the claims between the
original defendant and the third-party defendant to be ancillary to
the main suit,4 9 then it is only rational that all third-party claims
should be considered ancillary.50 As one court declared, "to hold other-
wise would deny the practical effect of Rule 14 to many cases. The ob-
ject of the Rule is to avoid circuity of action and multiple suits, to
adjust in a single suit the several phases of the same controversy." 51
By abandoning the independent jurisdictional requirement for a
plaintiff's third-party claim, much of the cost, delay and burden of
additional and unnecessary litigation in state courts would be elimi-
nated.
COLIN MILES GERSIION
THE TRANSACTION TEST FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX
LOSS DEDUCTIONS
When an individual taxpayer decides to invest money in the in-
vestigation and organization of a business, he incurs two financial risks.
Should the venture fail, he will lose his investment. Moreover, if the
taxpayer does not meet the statutory requirements of section 165 of
the Internal Revenue Code,' he will not be able to deduct this loss on
his federal income tax return. Section 165, the general loss section,
allows a deduction for any loss sustained during the taxable year which
is not compensated by insurance or otherwise. In the case of an invest-
ment by an individual, subsection (c) limits the deduction to losses
48For discussion of arguments in favor of applying the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction to all third-party claims see text accompanying notes 18-16 supra.
"Cases cited notes 14 and 15 supra.
EHoltzoff, Entry of Additional Parties in a Civil Action, 31 F.R.D. l1, 11o
(1963).
"Sklar v. Hayes, i F.R.D. 594, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
"Ir. RLv. CODE of 1954, § 165 provides in part:
(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or other-
wise.
(c) Liimitation on Losses to Individuals.-In the case of an individual,
the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to-
(I) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though
not connected with a trade or business; and
(3) losses of property not connected with a trade or business, if such
losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from
theft.
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from several sources among which are: losses incurred in a trade or
business, and those incurred in any transaction entered into for profit,
though not connected with a trade or business.2 Thus in the case of any
loss not incurred in connection with his trade or business, a taxpayer
must look to the "transaction entered into for profit" provision as the
only alternative means of receiving income tax relief for such loss.
The "transaction entered into for profit" test, codified as subsec-
tion (c) (2), requires the taxpayer to meet two criteria before the deduc-
tion will be allowed. First, he must have entered into the transaction
primarily to make a profit. Second, he must actually have entered into
a transaction. The requirement of a profit motive has been explained
by cases which, while permitting bona fide losses to be deducted, tend
to protect the Treasury from taxpayers who enter into ventures, fully
expecting failure, with the intention of deducting the losses incurred
against ordinary income.3 It is the second test, that of entering into an
actual transaction, which is not so clearly defined.
In Harris W. Seed,4 the taxpayer invested $1,566.82 in a joint ven-
ture to organize a savings and loan association. The co-incorporators
contributed their money to an "organization fund" to cover the cost
of a requisite economic study of the community, as well as legal, ac-
counting, and other fees in connection with the application for incor-
poration. The incorporation plans were then completed, and tentative
sales of stock were executed. Seed subscribed to 4,500 shares at a total
value of $63,ooo. Over 14,ooo additional shares were subscribed to by
the general public. The only item remaining before actual commence-
ment of business was the approval of the application for incorporation.
When approval was denied for the second time in July, 1964, the pro-
moters were forced to abandon the project.
On his federal income tax return for 1964, Seed deducted his entire
investment as a loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit.
2INT. REV. CODE Of 1954 § i65(c)(3), providing for casualty losses is not within
the scope of this comment.
3A taxpayer's investment must be "primarily" for profit, and "primarily" shall
-have its ordinary meaning of "first," or "principally." Theodore B. Jefferson, 50
T.C. 963, 968 (1968).
In Eli D. Goodstein, 3o T.C. 1178 (1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959),
the taxpayer was denied a deduction because it was found that he had entered
the transaction for tax-saving purposes. "In other words, there can be no deductible
loss allowed under section 165(c)(2) if the transaction which gave rise to the loss
has been determined to have been 'without economic substance' or a 'sham'."
Knetsch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932, 938 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
957 (,966).
'52 T.C. No. 93 (Aug. 28, 1969). At this writing this opinion has not been
paginated in an official reporter.
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The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disallowed the deduction on the
ground that Seed had not entered into any transaction before the pro-
ject was abandoned. In reviewing the determination of the IRS, the
Tax Court ruled that Seed's activities did indeed constitute a trans-
action, thereby approving the deduction.
In order to reach this result, the Tax Court was faced with the task
of ascertaining the statutory meaning of "transaction." As is frequently
the case in statutory interpretation where the definition of a term or
phrase is determinative, the court searched the legislative history;6
with respect to the term "transaction," however, the court found little
guidance. Section 165(c)(2) first appeared as section 5(a)(Fifth) of the
Revenue Act of 1916,6 and therefore the inquiry began with the com-
mittee reports regarding that act.7 These revealed that more emphasis
was placed upon the necessity of a profit motive than upon the defini-
tion of transaction. Indeed, the only comments involving this im-
portant term were that " '[t]ransaction' is a very broad word," and "by
itself means anything.' s The court ended its investigation of the
legislative history at this point, failing to note a rather material
difference between the 1916 provision and the current one. The
former allowed a deduction of losses on a transaction only to the extent
of any profits realized on that same transaction.9 Were this provision
still in force, Seed would certainly have been denied his deduction. The
Revenue Act of 191810 amended the provision to allow the loss to be
deducted in full without the requirement of antecedent profits. Al-
though this change does not in itself aid in the search for a definition,
it indicates that Congress apparently did not intend to require that
the taxpayer go so far as actually to engage in operations in order to
qualify for the deduction. The acts of 192411 and 193412 contained
changes immaterial to this discussion, and the language of section
23(e)(2) of the 1934 act is identical to the current section 165(c)(2) .13
In order to fill the void left by Congress, the Treasury has twice
issued rulings which attempt to define the term "transaction. 114 The
rId.
OCh. 463, § 5(a) (Fifth), 39 Stat. 756.
J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISroRy OF FEDERAL INcoME TAX LAWS,
1938-1861, at 963 (1938).
8Id. at 966.
'Ch. 463, § 5(a) (Fifth), 39 Stat. 756.
"°Ch. 18, § 214(a)(5), 40 Stat. 1057, 1067.
"Revenue Act of 1924 ch. 234, § 214(a)(5), 43 Stat. 253, 270.
'-Revenue Act of 1934 ch. 277, § 23(e)(2), 48 Stat. 68o, 689.
"3INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165(c)(2).
'"See Rev. Rul. 57-418, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 14 3 ;I.T. 1505, 1-2 CuM. BuLL. 112
(1922).
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more recent attempt, Revenue Ruling 57-48,15 states that a loss will be
"deductible [under subsection (c)(-)] only where the activities are more
than investigatory and the taxpayer has actually entered into a trans-
action for profit and the project is later abandoned."'15 It appears that
the Treasury is defining transaction as an activity which is more than
an investigation. This ambiguous definition is helpful only when ana-
lyzed in connection with the three cases 'that the Ruling attempted to
distinguish,16 and with I.T. 15C;5,'1 which it simultaneously revoked.
In 1922 the IRS published I.T. 1505, which ruled that the expenses
of an agent who traveled to Europe to investigate the possibility of
opening an export business were deductible after the project was
abandoned. Robert L. Hague'8 and Morton Frank,'9 two of the three
cases embodied in Rev. Rul. 57-48, seem to conflict with this view. In
Hague, the taxpayer was denied a deduction for legal fees paid for the
advice not to enter certain business ventures. To taxpayer's contention
that these fees were losses incurred in a transaction entered into for
profit, the Board of Tax Appeals replied, "The simple answer to this
contention is that petitioner did not enter into these -transactions but,
on the contrary, stayed out of them."20 Thus merely inquiring into the
advisability of a business venture does not constitute a transaction
under subsection (c)(2).
The second case in conflict with I.T. 1505 was Morton Frank, in
which taxpayers made several unsuccessful trips to various cities in an
attempt to purchase a radio station or a newspaper company. Tax-
payers tried to deduct travel expenses and legal fees incurred on the
trips, but the Commissioner refused to concede that they had entered
into any transaction. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner:
It cannot be said that petitioners entered into a transaction
every time they visited a new city and examined a new business
property.... Rather, they refused to enter into such transactions
after the preliminary investigation. 2 '
As in Hague, the court felt that petitioner Frank had not gone beyond
the investigatory stage.
1 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 143, 144.
"Morton Frank, 2o T.C. 511 (1953); Charles T. Parker, i T.C. 709 (1943);
Robert L. Hague, 24 B.TA. 288 (1931).
171-2 Cuu. BULL. 112 (1922).
1824 B.TA. 288 (ig3i).
'"o T.C. 511 (1953).
'24 B.T.A. at 29o.
212o T.C. at 514. See also Joseph W. Brown, 40 T.C. 861 (1963) (loss deduction
disallowed for expenses relating to the inspection of timber land which tax-
payer decided not to purchase).
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A different result was reached, however, in Charles T. Parker,22
the third case embodied in Rev. Rul. 57-418, Parker, a contractor, in-
vested in a joint venture to operate a placer gold mine. The investors
first inquired of another contractor as to the advisability of the pro-
ject, and upon his advice, made a thirty-day test run. When the recov-
ery proved to be lower than expected, the project was abandoned. The
court sustained petitioner's deduction of all his expenses as a loss in-
curred in a transaction for profit23 and justified its decision in the fol-
lowing language:
Although the transaction was to test the advisability of a more
extensive operation, it was nevertheless a transaction entered
into for profit.
[T]he fact that they [the test operations] did not result in a per-
manent undertaking does not take the transaction outside the
statutory provision.2 4
The Parker court seems to have been impressed by the fact that the
petitioner had actually engaged in "usual operations" for thirty days
before abandoning the project.25 In light of Seed this presents an in-
teresting situation. The petitioner in Seed validly argued that he had
gone beyond a mere preliminary investigation; it could not be said,
however, that he actually entered into "usual operations" of a savings
and loan association. Seed seems to represent the middle ground be-
tween "usual operations" and "preliminary investigation."
Two material facts of Seed distinguish Seed from Hague and Frank
on the one hand, and from Parker on the other. Clearly, the taxpayer
Seed did substantial work beyond the preliminary investigation stage
discussed in Hague and Frank. He prepared applications for incorpora-
tion and procured tentative commitments from outsiders. In fact, all
actions necessary for the commencement of the prospective business
had been completed. Unlike Parker, however, and through no fault of
his own, the taxpayer was never able to begin "usual operations." In
Seed, the Tax Court considered these "middle ground" activities as
constituting a transaction.
In a case similiar to Seed, Finch v. United States,2 6 the petitioner
made all the necessary arrangements prior to the purchase of land on
which he planned to erect a Holiday Inn Motel. He obtained a fran-




mi8 A.F.T.R.2d 5259 (D. Minn. 1966). This case is not reported in a West
reporter.
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chise from Holiday Inns of America, Inc. and arranged for a mortgage
on the realty. When the land became unavailable, the petitioner aban-
doned his plan, losing his investment in travel expenses to the site,
and legal fees for corporate and tax consultations. The district court
sustained his claimed deduction in excess of $3,500.27 Finch is a valu-
able aid to the taxpayer for it requires less activity than did Parker.
Neither Finch nor Seed considered the question of whether the
loss involved was ordinary or capital. Both Finch and Seed dearly ex-
ceeded the maximum statutory capital loss deduction of $3,ooo. 28 In
both cases, however, a deduction exceeding this amount was permitted.
It is questionable whether this result is correct. If the businesses had
succeeded, the organization costs would have been capitalized, 29 and
any losses of the investments would seemingly have been capital loss
subject to the $iooo deduction limitation. There are two possible ex-
planations for the courts' failure to consider this point.
The courts may have assumed that the investment was not a capital
one. Although the expenditures would have been capital in nature had
the businesses come into existence,30 in Seed and Finch the money was
spent in contemplation of a capital investment. The investments never
became capital ones because the corporations never became realities.
The argument that an investment is not capital until a corporation
comes into existence was used successfully in Champlain Coach Lines v.
Commissioner.31 A second explanation might be that the losses, al-
though involving capital items, do not come within the statutory defini-
tion of capital losses. Subsections (2) and (4) of Section 122232 define
such losses as those resulting from the "sale or exchange of a capital
2'For the significance of $3,5oo see text accompanying notes 29-34 infra.
'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1211(b) limits deductions of capital losses to Siooo.
0Items which must be capitalized are illustrated by the following cases:
Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5 th Cir. 1951) (cost of acquiring a liquor
license); Radio Station VBIR, Inc., 31 T.C. 8o3 (1959) (cost of acquiring a tele-
vision license); Dwight A. Ward, 20 T.C. 332 (1953) (expenses involved in research,
engineering, and travel preliminary to the organization of a corporation).
3°Dwight A. Ward, 2o T.C. 332, 343-44 (1953). INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 248
gives an election to amortize certain organizational costs.
31138 F.2d 9o4 (2d Cir., 1943). In order to extend operations to new territory,
corporate-taxpayer Champlain planned to create a wholly owned subsidiary
corporation. Champlain then bought 21o shares of the subsidiary's stock for $21,-
ooo. When the New York Public Service Commission denied the subsidiary the
right to operate, Champlain claimed a deduction of the full amount of its
investment. The court agreed that since the Public Service Commission had re-
fused to allow the subsidiary to issue stock (and thus to exist as a corporation),
Champlain had not made a capital investment. See also Rev. Rul. 56-529, 1956-2
CuM. BULL. 170.
'-INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1222(a)(4).
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